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A hallmark of law in the United States is the concept of due process or equal 
treatment under the law. Police are the gatekeepers of due process, the common initiators 
of the rules of law in civil society. A police officer's badge is the emblem of a shield, 
meant to protect and serve citizens from violence and crime. Yet today, so many citizens 
feel their shield is absent, if not weaponized against them.  This perception of 
malfeasance has become evident in the waves of outrage and protest that followed high 
profile applications of coercive and lethal force by the police in recent years1.  One need 
only look at the armor and munitions police deploy in the searches of citizens2 and on 
perimeters of protests3 as evidence that the tools of the police mission are converging 
with those of a soldier's mission. Such tools and tactics of the soldier are typically 
designed to treat people as potential combatants rather than citizens entitled to due 
process; yet we do not ask the same combat discipline of police as we do soldiers. 
Considering that these arsenals and tactics have been adopted in the advent of policy 
pushes coined as the War on Drugs and War on Terror, it stands to reason that police 
officers and citizens will benefit from a more comprehensive theory regarding 
justification of force. In this paper, I argue that the just war tradition, modified for 
domestic policing, can fulfill this need and solve the issues the citizens and activists have 
with police use of force. The following paper shows that under just war principles, the 
current ease police offers have in applying force to citizens cannot be justified, that 
certain threats posed to police cannot justify lethal force, and current principles governing 
the use of force ultimately undermine the police mission. I offer an introduction to Just 
War Theory and explain benefits of just war principles in Section I, modify them into just 
force principles appropriate for domestic policing in Section II, justify why said 
principles are accurate to apply to police as opposed to other sets in Section III, apply 
said principles to certain case studies and theory of policing in Section IV, and finally 
deal with potential objections that can be made to this application in Section V. 
 
 
 I. The Just War Tradition and its principles 
 
 The history of Just War Principles (JWP) roughly starts at the beginning of the 
Roman Empire. One of the first JWP theorists was the Stoic philosopher Cicero, who in 
44 B.C.E.  outlined the two main domains of JWPs: jus ad bellum, covering the initiation 
of war and jus in bello, constraints for the practices in war4. Theologian philosophers 
Augustine in the 5th century A.D. and Aquinas in the 13th century also expanded upon 
                                                 
1 Daniel Funke and Tina Susman, "From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of black men and women at the 
hands of police," Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-
20160707-snap-htmlstory.html. 
2 American Civil Liberties Union, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing, 
(New York: ACLU Foundation, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-
warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf. 
3 Marlena Baldacci, Emanuella Grinberg, and Holly Yan, "Dakota Access Pipeline: Police Remove 
Protesters; Scores Arrested," CNN, last modified October 27, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/27/us/dakota-access-pipeline-protests/. 
4 Wendy L. Hicks, "Constraints in the Police Use of Force: Implications of the Just War Tradition," 
American Journal of Criminal Justice 28, no. 2 (2004): 256. 
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Cicero's work on just war5. Notably, Aquinas helped set in place the specific criteria that 
would fall under the two domains Cicero developed. 6 
Jus ad Bellum (before war) Jus in Bello (during war) 
Just Cause Discrimination/non-combatant immunity 
Just Intent Proportionality 
Legitimate Authority Necessity 
Last Resort  
Throughout the centuries, many nations in the Western world used these principles as the 
basis for justifying war and leaders, philosophers, and jurists have continuously evaluated 
wars under this theory. This theoretical tradition has been around for so long that it has 
been enshrined in the international law of the United Nations Charter, Hague, and 
Geneva Conferences7. Even the field manuals of the US Armed Forces consider 
themselves bound to jus in bello considerations outlined in the Geneva conventions8. 
 
Traditional jus ad bellum principles 
 
The principles of jus ad bellum are the criteria for the initiation of a war typically 
applied by one state to another. Lackey defines war as “a controlled use of force, 
undertaken by persons organized in a functioning chain of command…the use of force in 
war must be directed to an identifiable political result”9. The bulleted list below provides 
the principles one actor has to fulfill in order to justify the intiation of war.  
 Just Cause: the guiding and underwriting principle, namely that defense against 
aggression is the only cause in which war is justified.  
 Competent Authority: this principle determines who can actually go to war and 
how. It prescribes that for a war to be just, a nation must initiate war via the 
proper authority and processes and do so publicly. So in the US, this would be 
fulfilled by congress making a declaration of war as specified in the Constitution.  
Traditionally, the only competent authorities are nation-states or political parties 
within such states that can maintain a military force10. 
 Right Intention: this principle states that the motive for war must be “right and for 
the sake of the right.”11 In other words, this rule is meant to eliminate certain 
secondary or tertiary motivations to war, such as racial hatred, potential spoils, 
and revenge. 
 Last Resort: this principle states that “a war cannot be just unless the evil that can  
reasonably be expected to ensue from the war is less than the evil that can be 
reasonably expected if the war is not fought.”12 This is also called the principle of 
                                                 
5 Hicks, "Constraints" 256-260. 
6 Hicks, "Constraints," 258. 
7 Douglas P. Lackey, "Just War Theory," in Ethics of War and Peace (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Education Inc., 1989), 263-264, 266-268. (Page #s in Applied Ethics 5th Ed)  
8 Lackey, "Just War Theory," 268. Cite the original sources 
9 Lackey, "Just War Theory," 263. 
10 Such things as terrorists as competent authorities are controversial in contemporary discussion of the 
theory 
11 Lackey, "Just War Theory," 264 
12 Lackey, "Just War Theory," 267. 
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proportionality, reasonable success, or necessity. It demands every other step be 
taken before resorting to war and that it will be “winnable.” 
These must all be fulfilled for a war to be considered justified; the failure to execute any 
aspect of these makes the war illegitimate on the part of the state. For example, if Cuba 
made an unannounced armed incursion into Florida, the aggression would justify 
American retaliation (just cause); however, the other principles must be accounted for. In 
order for competent authority to be fulfilled it has to adhere to a nation's established rules 
to war. The governors of Georgia or Florida could not declare war on Cuba because it 
takes an act of Congress to initiate war against the intruders. Right intent constrains the 
mission of the war: the right intent would be to repel the Cubans back to their nation.  
Continuing the war to annex Cuba, whether for its tobacco fields or retaliation over the 
Bay of Pigs, violates the justification to war. Last resort gets fulfilled by exercising other 
options to repel the invaders, such as the US encouraging the United Nations to enact 
sanctions that will impoverish Cuba. Last resort also means setting conditions for 
"winning."  Say the US has fulfilled all these criteria but estimates it cannot win a war in 
Florida without destroying at least half its infrastructure and x thousand citizens. It is at 
this point the proportional calculus may13 prove the war unwinnable.  
 
Traditional jus in bello principles 
 
The principles of jus in bello are the criteria that govern actions within a war, 
typically applied to the military officials. They are as follows: 
 Discrimination: this principle prohibits the targeting of noncombatants. 
 Proportionality: the scope of this principle is different from its jus ad bellum 
counterpart in that soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek.  
 Necessity: this principle states that collateral harm is permissible in the pursuit of 
military objectives only when the least harmful means are chosen.  
These principles must also be fulfilled during the course of the war for it to be justified; 
failure to uphold these despite complying with jus ad bellum considerations still makes 
the war unjustified. A contemporary illustration of jus in bello principles at work is 
troops securing a village so that friendly transport can travel unmolested. The "target" 
village is along a well-traveled supply route within or near enemy territory. All 
intelligence has indicated that the majority of the village is civilian farmers but there may 
still be combatant holdouts hiding out.  If the troops fail to exercise basic discrimination, 
they may turn the entire town hostile against their efforts. If they discover enemies within 
the village, they must do their best to protect the civilians and their property with 
proportional force. If the enemy takes a civilian building for defensive shelter, simply 
calling an air strike or heavy ordinance to destroy it would be disproportional. If the 
enemy is trying to blend in with the civilian population, troops must use the minimal 
amount of force necessary to "flush them out;" shooting into or above a crowd to see who 
retaliates is an unnecessary application. These active principles are meant to ensure the 
agents are using their force in a discriminate, proportional, and justifiable manner against 
enemy agents. When a soldier ignores these they put their nation's mission in danger. 
                                                 
13 I say "may" because different perspectives on proportionality that are addressed later in this section. 
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It should be noted that both last resort and proportionality each have subjective 
and objective variants regarding how they are weighed or considered. The following 
comes from Thomas Hurka: 
An objective version assesses a war or act in light of its actual effects, that is, the 
relevant good it actually produces and its actual destructiveness; a subjective 
version does so considering only an item's likely effects given the evidence 
available to the agents at the time.14 
While both variants must make similar probability estimates they differ enough so that 
sometimes the results can differ i.e. this war or act in war was objectively proportionate 
while subjectively disproportionate or vice versa. For the purposes of this paper I will be 
leaning heavily on objective proportionality and I do this for two reasons. First, the 
conduct of law enforcement should aim for objectivity so that an officer's actions are 
right and consistent throughout their role in any particular case. Second, a subjective 
reading hinges on the "fog of war" concept, otherwise known as situational unawareness. 
As a preliminary concern, I do not believe fog of war concepts should be applicable to a 
just force argument because they are justifications to force born out of ignorance and 
supposition. This concept of fog of war and subjective readings shall be revisited in later 
sections.  
 
IIa. Just War to Just Force 
 
 In this section I pivot from Just War Principles to what I call Just Force Principles 
(JFPs). JFPs translate JWPs to the context of the police force and explain when force is 
justified against civilians. First, I define police force and formulate the Just Cause JFP. 
Second, I argue that because police have a greater agency than soldiers, they must be held 
to an interdependent reading between jus ad bellum and jus in bello domains. Third, I 
examine some benefits of the  Just Force Principled Policing. The final part of this 
section will refine the language of the remaining just war principles into one more fitting 
for JFPs.  
 
The Embodiment of Force, the basis of just cause 
 
 The police are the gatekeepers of the legal system, and much of their agency is 
related to compelling cooperation with the system and enacting coercive force on those 
who oppose the system. The primary issue of a just force oriented theory is to determine 
what degree the actions of a police officer are force. Many departments use a force 
spectrum that starts with simple interaction15, and escalates through verbal command, 
passive techniques (handcuffs), chemical agents, active physical techniques, and ending 
with lethal force16. This spectrum, while seemingly simple, has developed much context 
over years of litigation and judicial review so as to define most actions of police 
interaction as force. Take the Supreme Court decision of Rodriguez v. United States 
                                                 
14 Thomas Hurka, "Proportionality in the Morality of War," Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 1 
(January 2005): 38, doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00024.x. 
15 It should be noted for the purposes of this paper simple interaction is not considered force despite its 
codification into use of force protocols 
16 Hicks, "Constraints," 266. 
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(2014) as an example of the potential nuance to force. The petitioner, Rodriguez, was 
stopped for driving on the shoulder, a violation of state law. After the officer checked 
identification and issued a warning to the offender, he asked if his search K-9 could walk 
around the car. Rodriguez refused and the officer held him there for back up to arrive. 
Once back up arrived the K-9 was deployed and alerted a presence of methamphetamine 
in the vehicle. Rodriguez's attorneys argued that the stop had been unlawfully extended to 
conduct the search, and their client had already been detained (held) for the purposes of 
the stop. The Supreme Court affirmed this and held that "absent reasonable suspicion, the 
police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution's 
shield against unreasonable seizures."17 In essence, the court said the police had 
completed their mission once the warning for the initial offense was issued and holding 
Rodriguez was unreasonable and unjustifiable force. Even simple actions by police, such 
as holding a citizen for an additional 7-8 minutes beyond typical due diligence (as in the 
Rodriguez case), can constitute unreasonable force.  
 Another issue at hand when defining force is that not all agencies define force in 
the same way. A case in point is the comparative use of force policies of the Dallas 
Police18, Las Vegas Metro Police19, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection(CBP)20 
agencies, which are seventeen, thirty-three, and one hundred seventeen pages 
respectively. Each of them deal with levels of control, force techniques, subject 
resistance, and weapon policies, but they all vary in the depth of their descriptions. While 
there are similar points between the Dallas and Las Vegas police guides, they differ in 
key places. Las Vegas, for instance, lists three levels of control: Low Level, Intermediate, 
and Lethal force. Twenty-two "tactics" are split across these levels ranging from officer 
presence, handcuffs, K-9 deployment to high speed car maneuvers, and Firearm use. 
Dallas lists five levels of control: Officer Presence, Verbal Control, Empty Hand Control, 
Intermediate Weapons, and Deadly Force with catch-all terms for certain tactics like Soft 
Empty Hand Control (Pressure Points, Handcuffing) and exact terms for others like 
Electronic Control Weapon (ECW). Discrepancies arise when Las Vegas and US 
Customs say ECWs are considered intermediate force while Dallas puts ECWs under 
Empty Hand Control or the "resort to force" level. The discrepancies become more 
evident when Las Vegas uses sixteen pages to define every tactic it lists21, CBP splits 
deadly force and less lethal force into two chapters spanning twenty pages22, and Dallas 
spends eight pages on Pepper Spray and ECWs while physical holds and impact weapons 
together barely take up half a page23. These are the documents used to define force for 
                                                 
17 SCOTUS, "Rodriguez v. United States," SCOTUS, last modified October 2014, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-9972_p8k0.pdf. 
18 Dallas Police Department, "Dallas Police Department General Order: Force Continuum," Dallas Police 
Department, last modified March 6, 2015, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/569ad58a0e4c1148e6b1079b/1452987
794280/Dallas+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf. 
19 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, "Use of Force," COPS Office: Grants and Resources for 
Community Policing, accessed February 20, 2017, https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/Use-of-Force.pdf. 
20 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Use of Force Policy Handbook," U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection | Securing America's Borders, last modified May 2014, 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/UseofForcePolicyHandbook.pdf. 
21 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, "Use of Force," 7-23 
22 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Use of Force Policy Handbook," 17-37 
23 Dallas Police Department, "Force Continuum" Pepper Spray 4-7, ECW 12-15, Holds and Impact 8-9 
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these particular agencies, yet there is little consistency between their descriptions. This is 
not to say that the agents of these departments would be as disparate as their force 
policies suggest, but civilians looking for redress have only these to rely on.  
 Before I begin to transit to just cause and what reasonable force looks like via JFP 
I need to define basic force. For the purposes of this paper, force is defined as a physical 
coercive act beyond simple interaction. I define simple interaction as an officer 
conversing with a citizen, whether for investigative purpose or suspicion of a crime. If the 
officer believes to have enough evidence to arrest someone (for a crime that requires 
arrest) and the suspect surrenders willingly then we would say little to no force has been 
used. It is important to make the distinction of "simple interaction" because such simple 
interactions can make the difference and it complicates the mission of police to consider a 
basic inquiry as force. The distinction is also made to recognize that while police do have 
the capability to stop and question citizens, that capability be abused crossing into force. 
This abuse would be evident in cases where a citizen is not stopped for legitimate legal 
purposes but as a harassment tactic, maybe in retaliation for an acquittal or some other 
motive. Now that I have defined force its important to see what is justifiable force.  
To better define reasonable police force at this stage we should look to the Just 
Cause principle. This principle states that defense against aggression is the only 
justifiable cause to go to war i.e. use force. When modifying the principle to policing 
there is a temptation to term "aggression" as the wholesale violation of law, since law 
encompasses all of what the police are trying to protect and serve. I argue that force can 
only be applied to laws pertaining to general security of life and liberty, which I will call 
protective laws. Examples of these include what the FBI calls index crimes: criminal 
homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary motor vehicle theft, and arson.24 25 
These are crimes that all involve an aggressive party who aims to circumvent the security 
of general good. Therefore Just Cause as JFP will apply to the defense of protective laws 
as they are the laws that are broken by violent aggression and can deprive a victim of life 
and liberty. It should also follow that this is the underwriting principle of all following 
JFPs, and any deployment of force not in defense of a protective law fails to be justified.  
 
Greater agency 
 
Traditionally, what merits the demarcation between domains is how the structure 
of military command system is set up. Initiation of war is reserved to executive and 
legislative authority, for distinct mission parameters upon which the military hierarchy 
acts, attempts, and reports back to the executive for guidance should those parameters be 
threatened. According to traditionalist theory, there is a distinct firewall between the 
agents of initiation and the agents of conflict: soldiers are responsible and report to the 
officers of military command and not the legislative or executive force that authorized 
force. This is reinforced by the soldier's agency being restricted by military discipline; 
they are oath bound and contracted, trained and paid to live and act according to 
command. In essence, an active duty soldier is denied a complete civilian agency for the 
                                                 
24 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics," Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
last modified January 23, 2009, https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm. 
25 Larceny-theft is also an index crime but I have removed it on the basis that it is described as theft "not 
taken by force and violence or by fraud" italics added for emphasis 
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purpose of the mission, as long as they are active they are not private citizens. This is in 
stark contrast to law enforcement: legislative power determines the mission of law, the 
enforcement agents then initiate contact based on suspicion of a crime. As evidence 
accumulates they are given greater latitude to pursue a violation of the law. Once the 
figurative trigger is pulled on a mission, soldiers will execute their orders and keep 
knowledge of the orders constricted to chain-of-command. Provided there is no evidence 
of jus in bello violations they will repeat this process. The police mission is to charge a 
civilian with criminal acts for which they have collected sufficient evidence for judicial 
review and potentially a civilian jury. Should the civilian resist the progression of due 
process, it falls on police to both initiate (jus ad bellum) and execute (jus in bello) a 
coercive force. This difference is the reason why principles from both domains should 
cross over for our examination.  
 
The Moral Benefit of Just Force Principled Policing 
 
 When we discuss the benefits of JFP policing it is important to discuss just war's 
origins in morality. Many of the philosophers and theologians discussed previously were 
concerned with the horrors of war and how to reconcile them in a civil and moral 
framework. Cicero developed qualifications and justifications to war with a belief that 
within natural law a just war's primary purpose would be peace. Augustine believed that 
the waging of war was not evil in itself, but those who waged a noble honorable war for 
the common good would be just in their violence. Aquinas thought war was for two 
purposes, punishment of sin and rectification of wrong wrought on the common good. All 
of these early progenitors thought that violence in warfare must have some underlying 
moral components to be justified. Thus, when we talk about just force we are, in a way, 
talking about morality constraining violence to ultimately prevent more violence.  
 The re-centering morality in police use of force is the advantage of a JFP 
approach to policing. Often, when the public perceives excessive force from agents of the 
law, the typical agency's response is something along the lines of "Suspect resisted 
obedience, officer followed training and acted within confines of the law." This response 
is problematic because police represent the confines of the law. How well or poorly they 
do their jobs sets these confines, accidental killings and excessive application of force 
devalues law because such harms collapse due process.  To a certain extent this is 
understandable because moral superiority has great potential to come into play when one 
pledges to be an agent of the law. There is also the basic dynamic of suspicion in police 
work as the primary justification to further embroil one in the justice process. These two 
aspects of police work lend themselves to a conflation of moral superiority and legal 
suspicion. Such a conflation would lead to what we might call the improper embodiment 
of law, in which law enforcement agents tend to view themselves as the law proper, 
rather than an agent subservient to law. Thus, when we arrive at another controversial 
application of force, the police response (possibly without outright recorded evidence to 
the contrary) signifies the moral superiority of suspicion: suspect resisted obedience to 
the law, officer as law upheld practice of law, officer properly upheld the confines of law. 
JFP policing seeks to remedy this by using JFPs, rather than suspicion and conflation that 
one's particular failure or lack of obedience to an agent is the same disobedience to the 
general good the law aims to protect. By definition, police are always dealing with some 
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form of disobedience of the law. JFPs help better define the conditions in which force is 
necessary, safe, and most importantly, justified.  
 
II.b The Principles of Just Force 
 
Jus ad bellum (to initiate force) principles 
 
Just Cause 
Just Cause is the underlying principle in determining both when war is justified 
and when police force is justified. In a police context, it applies to protective laws meant 
to secure the life and liberty of citizens. This principle means that for force to be initiated, 
the crime has to pose a threat to a particular victim's life or liberty.  Preventative or 
preemptive force is typically unjustifiable as JFP. The only possible exception is in cases 
where there is an established preponderance of evidence that the specific target has 
committed and is willing to commit further violence. I will call this the manhunt 
exception, in which force can be deployed to prevent the further escape of an individual 
who has either already been sentenced in violation of a protective law or a suspect in the 
phase of apprehension to be formally charged for a protective violation. It should be 
stressed the manhunt exception is for people still willing to commit violence, if a suspect 
is cooperative in surrendering then the exception does not apply.  
 
Right Intention 
 This principle states that the intent of force must be precisely for the defense of 
protective law. Should any other motive be found as the primary intention to force then 
that force is unjustified. Prohibited intentions would include retaliatory force applications 
in response to an officer injured or killed on duty. Also prohibited is shock tactics like 
making an example out of a particular suspect, or a widespread drug raid in a 
neighborhood because of a high profile overdose. These may be reasons for police to 
increase their enforcement efforts regarding a particular crime, but such reasons can 
never necessitate a relaxed resort to force or an increased baseline of force.  
 
Competent Authority 
 This is the professional officer principle, which separates officers from 
conventional citizenry and defines what they owe to the citizenry. An officer of the law is 
someone who pledges an oath to protect their specific community, who typically wears a 
uniform to make their power and responsibility known, and engages in a continuous 
defensive effort of their community. It is under this principle that police identify 
themselves and the relevant crime during an arrest. Also, it should be noted that a 
competent police authority also keeps proper and complete records of force involved 
between their agency and their community. This last portion is for the citizens' right to 
examine the competence of their authorities to establish force for positive achievable 
results. Police cannot be considered competent if they cannot publicly account for all uses 
of force they have applied to their community.  
 
Last Resort 
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 This principle states that all other methods to subdue a suspect must be reasonably 
employed before a resort to force. If an officer reasonably believes a suspect can be 
"talked down" from their actions they must attempt to do so before using force. While it 
might be strange to consider it proportional, a general threat of force can also be 
considered as an attempt to get a suspect to stand down before force is used. This is 
proportional in that it notifies the suspect that should these more diplomatic efforts fail to 
gain acquiescence, then force as the last resort will be applied. Reasonability is 
paramount in the application of this principle: obviously a man about to plunge a dagger 
into someone else can reasonably be expected to have defensive force used against him. 
One could say this disadvantages the mentally unfit or disabled but if an officer can 
discern such mental states and reasonably believe they can protect the potential victim by 
extending the confrontation until a specialist comes in, they should.  
  
Should all these principles be fulfilled then an officer is obliged to consider jus in bello 
principles before they are permitted to use force. Should they be able to fulfill all those 
principles they will determine the extent, degree, and focus of force will be justified by 
the following principles. 
 
Jus in bello (using force) principles 
 
 Discrimination 
 This principle prohibits the targeting of any civilians not suspected in the 
violation of a protective law. This means that force can only be enacted upon the suspect 
who has gone through the jus ad bellum justification.  Each person who may become 
further involved must be evaluated separately and clear all principles.  
 
Proportionality 
 This principle states that an officer may only use force proportional to the force a 
suspect threatens. At the beginning of a force application, an officer can only deploy the 
least amount of force to attain a given end. If a single suspect is unarmed but 
uncooperative, then after a warning, the officer would engage in physical altercation to 
subdue the suspect.  On a larger scale this principle allows lethal force in an active 
shooter situation, or less lethal26 force in a riot situation.  This also means the force 
application scales up in an asymmetric interaction if two suspects were facing a single 
officer and down if two officers were facing one suspect. This principle, when applied to 
one-on-one unarmed interactions, is physically agnostic. Basic physical attributes of the 
officer and suspect should not influence the force application. Professional officers are 
expected to be trained in hand to hand combat and to be physically fit regardless of base 
stature: those who are not fit and use such physical "disproportionality" to justify greater 
force are unfit to be agents of the law. 
 
Necessity 
                                                 
26 Less lethal in this case referring to the class of weaponry or ammunition that if used properly can subdue 
a person but has the potential to become lethal in certain cases i.e. flashbangs, bean bags, pepper shells, tear 
gas. 
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 While the just war iteration of this principle states that collateral harm is 
permissible in pursuit of a military objective only when the least harmful means are 
chosen, this is not true of JFP. Necessity as just force cannot accept collateral harm to 
people because no criminal, no matter how severe, can be brought to justice at the cost of 
innocent bystanders. So necessity as JFP aims to reduce the application of force as it 
applies to citizens proximate to the suspect. If there is a situation in which the suspect 
could be better apprehended with minimal force then that is the more justifiable option. If 
there is a situation where the potential harm to bystanders can be negated, then that is the 
more justifiable option. For example, if the police have the evidence to arrest a drug 
dealer for violent crimes but their house is filled with kids every evening, the necessity 
principle dictates that the attempt should be made at a time when children are not present.  
 
 These are the just force principles I defend in the remainder of the paper. They are 
roughly equivalent to their just war counterparts and the changes made are those with 
respect to the different setting in which law enforcement engages in their mission as 
opposed to the military. All further references to the names of these principles will 
assume the just force stance described above unless noted otherwise.  
 
III. Justifying Just Force Application 
 
 The importance of JFPs can be justified in a few ways, which I explore in this 
section. The first will be a historical view in which I show that similar principles were 
used in the establishment of modern police. Second, I will examine some key Supreme 
Court cases that have used criteria similar to JFPs in defining police force. Finally, I will 
show how the policies of the domestic "wars" against Drugs and Terror push the police 
closer to military style tactics that necessitate the more rigorous JFP application. The 
examination of all these areas will show the inherent utility of these principles but also 
demonstrate that without the interacting context of other principles, they fall short of a 
consistent force usage theory. 
 
The Peel Principles 
 
 As mentioned before, a just war philosophy has existed for millennia prior to the 
existence of modern policing. For hundreds of years, many people enforcing order 
domestically or abroad were soldiers or knights beholden to sovereign power. The first 
state backed police force was established in Paris, France 1667 A.D. when King Louis 
XIV established the office of lieutenant general of police, seventeen centuries after 
Cicero coined Just War domains.  Modern Policing and many of its hallmarks can be 
credited to Sir Robert Peel's establishment and passing of the Metropolitan Police Act in 
London 182927. This was done to consolidate the inconsistent organizations, private and 
public, policing around London the prior century. To assure the citizenry that the police 
                                                 
27 Mayors Office for Policing and Crime, "The Metropolitan Police How It All Began - Metropolitan Police 
Service," Home - Metropolitan Police Service, accessed November 21, 2016, 
http://content.met.police.uk/Article/The-Metropolitan-Police-how-it-all-
began/1400015336362/1400015336362. 
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were there for the public good, Peel had nine principles of Law Enforcement attributed to 
him: 
   
1. The basic mission for which police exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the 
repression of crime and disorder by military force and severity of legal punishment. 
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police 
existence, actions, behavior and the ability of the police to secure and maintain public respect. 
3. The police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law 
to be able to secure and maintain public respect. 
4. The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes, proportionately, to the 
necessity for the use of physical force and compulsion in achieving police objectives. 
5. The police seek and preserve public favor, not by catering to public opinion, but by constantly 
demonstrating absolutely impartial service to the law, in complete independence of policy, and 
without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws; by ready offering of 
individual service and friendship to all members of society without regard to their race or social 
standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humor; and by ready offering of 
individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life. 
6. The police should use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or 
to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be 
insufficient to achieve police objectives; and police should use only the minimum degree of 
physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective. 
7. The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the 
historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police are the only 
members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on 
every citizen in the intent of the community welfare. 
8. The police should always direct their actions toward their functions and never appear to usurp 
the powers of the judiciary by avenging individuals or the state, or authoritatively judging guilt or 
punishing the guilty. 
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of 
police action in dealing with them28 
 
A quick overview of these outline some rough analogs to just war/force principles. P129 
is analogous to the just cause for police force. P5, P8, P9 trace prescriptions for what can 
be considered right intentions for police and their work: the phrase "never appear to" in 
P8 suggests that even the public perception of extra-legal tactics is bad for police. P4 and 
P6 have strains of both last resort and proportionality in them by noting proportionality 
relation to public cooperation and when an individual refuses "persuasion, advice and 
warning." Necessity is also established in P6 in the phrase, "should use only the 
minimum degree of physical force which is necessary." Within six of the Peel principles 
there exists some analog to five of seven just force principles; however it is in 
ascertaining the remaining discrimination and competent authority JFPs where Peel 
principles become problematic.  
in 
                                                
One of the attractions of the Peel Principles is that they outline a dynamic that 
empowers community policing. However, that dynamic fails the more specific use of 
force context of JFP. This dynamic reveals itself when we look for principles resembling 
discrimination and competent authority. When looking at the nine Peel Principles as a 
whole, six of them explicitly mention the public and establish relation functions between 
 
28 Robert Peel, "Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement 1829," Durham Constabulary, last 
modified 1829, https://www.durham.police.uk/About-
Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf. italics are from original text 
29 Shorthand reference to principles P1 = Peel Principle 1, P2 = Principle 2 and so on 
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public and police. Competent authority and discrimination become complicated because 
if we take these six public Peel Principles to describe what makes police power 
competent and forceful, there are quite a few different public definitions to contend with. 
First is P2, which says police ability is dependent on "public approval" of police 
existence and their ability to secure "public respect." Then P3 specifies public respect be 
secured through "willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law". 
P4 states this cooperation deteriorates proportional to the necessity of force and 
compulsion. Three principles by themselves set up a rudimentary formula for competent 
authority but structurally set up a negative feedback loop based on their existence to 
detect those who do not cooperate and coerce them to justice.  
The problem is further complicated in P5 when its distinction between "public 
favor" and "public opinion" and preserving public favor entails "impartial service to the 
law" independent of policy and the substance of laws. P5 makes impartiality difficult 
when police must offer service, friendship, courtesy, good humor, and ready sacrifice in 
protecting life. While all of these are what we should expect from police, it is hard to 
differ from public favor and opinion , especially in the case when the public has a right to 
protest policy and the substance of a law.  P7 further confuses the matter, stating police 
relations should "give[s] reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and 
the public are the police". P7 illustrates the symbiotic truth of a functioning justice 
system, but as a systemic premise it blows any chance at developing a criterion for 
discrimination. Furthermore, it makes the equation for competent authority a complex 
balance of courting public approval, respect, favor, and perception.  So while the Peel 
Principles illustrate the intuitiveness of JFPs, their scope is too wide to make any sort of 
consistent force application theory superior to them.  
 
The Supreme Court Principles 
 
The next place we can look to justify JFP application is in rulings from the US 
Supreme Court and their use of similar criteria. For example, we can see the Just Cause 
principle at play in the ruling of Tennessee v. Garner (1985). Responding on a potential 
"prowler" call, Memphis police responded to a woman who indicated she had heard a 
break in the house next door. Upon investigating the back of the house, Officer Hymon 
heard a door slam and saw someone run across the yard. At the edge of the yard, Officer 
Hymon cornered suspect Garner who was crouched against a 6-foot high chain link 
fence. Officer Hymon approached the suspect after reasonably determining Garner was 
unarmed and verbally commanded him to stop. Garner then attempted to climb the fence, 
at which point Officer Hymon determined Garner would escape if he did clear the fence. 
Hymon discharged his firearm to prevent escape and killed Garner. The law at stake was 
a Tennessee Statute that allowed an officer "all necessary means" to effect arrest after 
providing notice to arrest a suspect30. The Supreme Court ruled against the application of 
force, saying that lethal force was an unreasonable seizure of the person in question, 
developing this standard: 
Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that 
he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, 
                                                 
30 SCOTUS, "Tennessee V. Garner (full Text) :: 471 U.S. 1 (1985) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center," 
Justia Law, last modified March 27, 1985, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/1/case.html. 
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deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has 
been given (Tennessee v. Garner, 1985, p. 12). 
This language establishes that the rationale for lethal force must be that of a defensive 
nature in which the intention towards serious violence is obvious. This also further 
resembles Just Cause in that it stipulates the nature of justifiable defense is rooted in life 
and not property, as was case in Tennessee v. Garner.  
Another decision which borrows similar just war criteria is the ruling of Graham 
v. Connor (1989). The Petitioner Graham, after feeling the onset of an insulin reaction, 
asked his friend to drive him to a convenience store for orange juice. Graham entered the 
store and upon seeing the line for the register promptly left. Outside officer Connor had 
witnessed Graham quickly enter and leave the store, so he made an investigative stop, 
and ordered the pair to wait while he found out what happened at the store. Responding 
Officers handcuffed Graham and ignored any attempts he made to explain his condition 
and reason for leaving the store.  During this hold Graham was injured in multiple places 
and he filed suit, alleging the officers had used excessive force and violated his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution31. The court ruled against Graham, 
stating that his suit regarding excessive force needed to be evaluated by the "objective 
reasonableness" standard of the Fourth Amendment, rather being based in the 
"substantive due process" protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court then 
explicitly affirmed this four part test as the standard from which excessive force could be 
judged: 
The factors to be considered in determining when the excessive use of force gives rise to a cause 
of action under 1983: (a) the need for the application of force; (b) the relationship between that 
need and the amount of force that was used; (c) the extent of the injury inflicted; (d) whether the 
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously, and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. (Graham v. Connor, 1989, p.391) 
Common principles are at work here in these established criteria. Part (a) roughly mirrors 
necessity by establishing that there must be need for a force application and by 
implication suggests last resort in that the officer use alternative means before needing 
force. Part (b) is almost a word for word reading of proportionality, establishing the same 
relation between need and amount of force.  Part (c) is the objective state that is used in 
conjunction with the other parts to determine excessiveness. Finally with part (d) the 
language clearly links to right intent in that force application must always be in good 
faith, but also can be read as a last resort constraint in that a malicious or sadistic force 
application cannot be one of last resort. Similar criteria and restrictions on force 
application are enshrined in this supreme court decision.  
While the four part test set in Graham v. Conner (1989) uses principles similar to 
JFP, it also sets up a dilemma regarding proportionality in setting another standard. This 
standard is conveyed in the phrase, "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must 
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight."32 It is here that standard of evidence meriting use of force is 
ultimately up to the situation the officer is in at the time, or what was earlier referred to as 
a subjective reading of proportionality. The considerations must be according to the 
evidence at the time, yet the language of part(c) in the four part test is objective as to "the 
                                                 
31 SCOTUS, "Graham V. Connor :: 490 U.S. 386 (1989) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center," Justia Law, 
last modified May 15, 1989, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/386/. 
32 SCOTUS, "Graham v. Connor." 490 U.S. 396 
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extent of injury inflicted".  This may create a dilemma for JFP as formulated in this paper 
because of the focus on objective readings of proportionality for the theory. 
  This dilemma illustrates the asymmetry that has to be resolved in the translation 
of Just War to Just Force. In Just War a common precept is that soldiers, by engaging in a 
military command structure, forfeit their right to life, e.g. are liable to be killed in acts of 
war. War, justified or unjustified, still has symmetry of agency between opposing 
militaries. With Just Force we must determine the agencies involved in a civilian 
population. However, officers of the law are not immersed in some theater of 
conventional lawlessness like a soldier may be deployed in. Officers do have right to life, 
but it must be argued here that right does not supersede that of citizens, guilty or 
innocent. That is not to say that under JFP police cannot rely in what they believe to be 
proportional on the scene, but is a reminder that police actions, including applications of 
force, are ultimately validated and justified by the completion of lawful due process. 
 The similarities of these principles matters in that, through other means, the 
justification of violence arrived at similar intuitions. While just war principles were 
developed for macro scale operations of violence, these legal analogs were arrived at 
examining micro scale instances of violence. This indicates is that there is a common 
intuition regarding the justifications to violence for the better good. However, the 
similarity ends by virtue of how these legal principles came about. Because these 
principles have been arrived at through cellular instances of violence and certain cases 
have developed certain principles they lacks the systemic unity to perform a consistent 
just force calculus. In other words, other legal precedents can be injected to alter the legal 
principle calculus. JFPs can still improve upon these principles because of their 
fragmented through litigation nature.   
 
Domestic "Wars" 
 
  The next and possibly the most important reason to justify JFP application is the 
expansion of police powers and technology under the auspices of a war footing, thus 
meriting the application of rules governing war. The first of these is the "War on Drugs," 
a set of policy initiatives coined by President Nixon aimed at tackling the nation's drug 
problem with new laws and resources. These initiatives, which were echoed and enforced 
by the administrations that followed, have created a special class of crime that has 
allowed the police to adopt extraordinary force in the execution of warrants and 
subpoenas.  
An example of such a policy is section 1208 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1990, which allowed for the transfer of military equipment 
from the Department of Defense to federal and state agencies specifically for counter-
drug use. This section would be changed to the better known section 1033 in the 1997 
NDAA, which broadened language of enforcement agencies and their mission, with 
preference given to counter-drug and counter terrorism purposes33. Such policies have 
had the effect of equipping almost every city with its own Special Weapons and Tactics 
                                                 
33 Defense Logistics Agency, "1033 Program FAQs," Defense Logistics Agency, accessed 
November 22, 2016, 
http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramFAQs.aspx. 
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(SWAT) team, a paramilitary unit designed to handle hostage, barricade, or active 
shooter situations.  
While SWAT teams existed prior to the War on Drugs, they were seldom used. At 
the beginning of Nixon's Drug War there were a few hundred drug related deployments 
of the teams each year. At the turn of the 21st century, there were over forty thousand 
drug raids a year across the country34. The majority of SWAT raids are searches for 
drugs conducted by numerous armored officers equipped with military grade assault 
rifles and tactical grenades. Sometimes they arrive in military style vehicles, breaking 
down doors or windows to gain entry, and screaming at gunpoint to whomever is on th
property, including instances in which children are known to be pr 35
e 
esent .   
                                                
Then there is the Reagan Administration's contribution to the War on Drugs, 
namely allowing any law enforcement agency to fold the spoils of any drug related 
seizure (otherwise known as civil asset forfeiture) into their coffers for any use. Congress 
granted that federal agencies could retain all proceeds from forfeitures and state and local 
agencies could retain up to 80 percent of proceeds.36  These funds do not go back to the 
community in which they were seized but to the enforcement agency itself. Thus it 
increased the benefit to pursue these specific crimes through capture of resources. Just 
these two efforts have effectively created a force that looks very much like a roving army 
intent to reap the spoils of war regardless of the collateral damage. This behavior is in 
spite of the fact they engage many civilians who are innocent.  
The tools of war combined with the Reagan-era incentives to use them have 
created a situation in which police more easily resort SWAT shock tactics whereas their 
necessity is questionable. According to a 2011-2012 ACLU study of 20 SWAT enabled 
organizations, "of the incidents in which officers believed a weapon would be present, a 
weapon was actually found at the scene in only 35 percent of cases"37 further bringing 
into question the need for so many brute force raids. This data also indicates a 
convergence between police and soldiers that merits a JFP application.  
The other main policy measure that illustrates the merit of a Just Force application 
is the "War on Terror".  While this term typically refers to the international conflicts 
started in response to the 9/11 attacks, it also refers to a set of domestic policies meant to 
deter and detect plots within the country. A keystone policy of this War is the USA 
PATRIOT Act signed into law October 26, 2001, later reaffirmed in a modified format in 
the 2015 USA FREEDOM Act. This set of laws essentially created a more unconstrained 
set of enforcement powers, provided the civilian was under suspicion of terrorism, 
computer fraud or abuse, or being a foreign agent engaged in clandestine activities. 
PATRIOT also effectively changed the mission language of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (also called FISA) to relax restrictions when foreign surveillance 
concurred with separate criminal investigations, making it easier to secure a secret 
warrant for electronic surveillance of a suspected citizen. Such policies also drove the 
development of new surveillance technologies such as the StingRay cell phone 
surveillance device, which is now widely used by federal and local law enforcement 
 
34 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2010), 73 
35 American Civil Liberties Union, "War Comes Home". 2 
36 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 77-78 
37 American Civil Liberties Union, "War Comes Home". 4 
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agencies38. It is these policies that have pushed law enforcement officers closer to the 
role of soldiers and certain investigative capabilities closer to military style intelligence.  
                                                
The War on Terror, much like War on Drugs, adds a new dimension to the 
mission of law enforcement, a special class that distorts due process and gives them 
better tools for their mission.  What is troubling about these tools is that they were 
initially designed for military and intelligence objectives against known or suspected 
enemies of the state, not citizens of the state. Using these tools against civilians creates a 
greater potential for indiscriminate use, especially if an agency has to justify the purchase 
or acquisition of such tools.  Combine the intelligence tools with military styled armor, 
munitions, equipment and the convergence of officer and soldier appears closer and 
closer.  Such a convergence of roles and abilities necessitate a JFP examination to 
evaluate whether the advance  
 
IV. The Just Force Application 
 
In this section I apply Just Force Principles to certain cases relevant to police use-
of-force. The first application is the Broken Windows theory of policing, its origins, and 
the controversial practices that spawned in its wake. The second case is the War on Drugs 
and its tactic of SWAT searches discussed in the last section as meriting these principles. 
Third will examine Department of Justice reports of Ferguson and Baltimore police and 
reevaluating some of their findings through JFP justification. Finally, stemming from the 
DOJ reports, I make the case that corporate interests of police currently come into 
conflict with the competent authority and by extension right intent principles. These 
examinations will show that JFPs can be applied to a wide variety of theory and tactics, 
prove such force practices to be unjustified and yet illustrate how and where practices can 
be improved. 
 
Broken Windows 
 One of the theories under fire today is the concept of Broken Windows or order 
maintenance policing39. The main source of Broken Windows policing comes from an 
article in the Atlantic by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, about surprising results 
from a controlled experiment within a New Jersey police foot patrol program.  While the 
foot patrols had not reduced crime rates in communities, the residents of those 
communities felt safer, believed crime was reduced, and had a higher opinion of police40.  
Officers who performed the patrol reported higher morale and a better opinion of the 
citizens they served in return41.  These results surprised Kelling and Wilson, who knew 
that data had largely discredited foot patrols as effective policing methods. All the 
officers did on a foot patrol was keep to an area, know the people who lived or traveled 
through there, and keep informal rules about how certain types behaved in their area.  An 
 
38 Kate Klonik, "Stingrays, IMSI Catchers: How Local Law Enforcement Uses an Invasive Surveillance 
Tool," Slate Magazine, last modified October 11, 2014, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_law_e
nforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.html. 
39 Other Police departments like the NYPD refer to such arrests as Quality-of-Life arrests. 
40 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, "Broken Windows," The Atlantic, last modified March 1982, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. 
41 Kelling and Wilson, "Broken Windows." 
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example of the informal rules and how they played out is with the local drunks/addicts. 
While typically harmless, drunks/addicts were expected to sit up when on stoops and 
have their drinks in paper bags. They could drink on side streets but not at major 
intersections, and there was a stark prohibition against bothering people at bus stops42.  
Violators of these rules would be ridiculed by the community, and be arrested for 
vagrancy if not responsive to police command. Kelling and Wilson believed that there 
must be some causal link between disorder and crime for these results to occur. In their 
piece they pointed to a social experiment by Phillip Zimbardo as the paradigm for why. 
Zimbardo had, thirteen years earlier, set up an experiment in which he placed cars with 
the hood up and without plates in two different places to observe what would happen. 
One was placed in a poor area of the Bronx in New York City, where it was vandalized 
by others after only 10 minutes and destroyed within a day. Another was placed in 
affluent Palo Alto, California where it stood untouched for over a week, until Zimbardo 
smashed part of it with a sledgehammer and then it was vandalized to destruction. 
Kelling and Wilson reasoned that in the poorer Bronx, very few people respected 
property as much as people in affluent Palo Alto. In Palo Alto, the smashed car signaled 
that "no one cared" for it. Hence the Broken windows concept: small victimless crimes 
(graffiti, public intoxication, prostitution) signal the disorder of a community to more 
serious criminals and serious crimes. 
 While the foot patrols demonstrated a way of community policing, Kelling and 
Wilson's Broken Windows theory would later end up justifying more nefarious police 
practices. The most notable of these would be the Zero Tolerance policy and later the 
Stop-and-Frisk programs implemented in New York City43. Zero Tolerance in the 90s 
would be used to arrest fare jumpers on the subway, people selling loose cigarettes, 
anyone drinking in public, smoking marijuana, panhandlers, and many more. Stop-and-
Frisk in the 00s would shed the pretense of misdemeanors and stop people for "furtive 
movements"; in practice, people were stopped on suspicion of physical appearance.  
These policies would continue despite Kelling's insistence that the "theory was never 
intended to be a high-arrest program"44, or that further studies have failed to confirm 
Broken Windows much less the link between disorder and crime45. Stop-and-Frisk only 
came to end in 2013 when a judge ruled that the practice was disproportionately used 
against people of color46. In the end, while Broken Windows (as envisioned by Kelling 
and Wilson) might have had good results in it's original community setting, its 
implementation in other places would lead to high profile and sometimes lethal force 
applications that started as interactions over misdemeanor crimes like jaywalking or 
selling loose cigarettes.  
                                                 
42 Kelling and Wilson, "Broken Windows." 
43  Shankar Vedantam et al., "How A Theory Of Crime And Policing Was Born, And Went Terribly Wrong 
: NPR," NPR.org, last modified November 1, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500104506/broken-
windows-policing-and-the-origins-of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-it-went-wrong. 
44 George L. Kelling, "Don't Blame My 'Broken Windows' theory for Poor Policing," Politico, last modified 
August 11, 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/broken-windows-theory-poor-policing-
ferguson-kelling-121268#.Vcy6tJc6-ff. 
45 Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, "Broken Windows Policing," Center for Evidence Based Crime 
Policy - George Mason University, accessed November 26, 2016, cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-
works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/broken-windows-policing/. 
46 Vedantam, "How a Theory of Crime." 
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 Broken Windows is impermissible in light of the JFPs I defend above. It fails just 
cause because many of these crimes do not put others at risk of violence. The theory also 
violates right intention in that the motive to enact force on these crimes is not the 
protection of others, but negating the perception of the community as "disordered". It is 
important to remind the reader that any one violation rules the theory impermissible, the 
fact it fails both illustrates its incoherence.  
It should be noted Broken Windows may pass last resort. If we take the theory as 
originally envisioned, a beat cop who uses informal rules to deal with misdemeanors 
without immediately resorting to arrest, it does demonstrate a proportional option short of 
force. However if we take the aforementioned policies inspired by Broken Windows in 
which force is used, then it fails proportionality by its indiscriminate pursuit of the 
victimless crimes. Ultimately the Broken Windows theory has some intuitive thoughts 
about community policing, but in practice its actions cannot be justified through JFPs.  
 
The Drug War 
 
 
 The War on Drugs is rife with examples of JFP violations as the lack of its 
effectiveness has played out over the decades. As discussed in Section III, the Drug War 
has contributed to a convergence of police and soldier agencies primarily through its use 
of SWAT tactics. These tactics are being deployed against crimes involving the sale, 
distribution, and use of drugs.  From the outset, the elevation of force for drug crimes 
violates just cause in that -absent other factors- a drug trade by itself does not involve 
violence. While some do use violence as a means for their drug trade, it is the violence, 
not the exchange of drugs for money, that make SWAT force justifiable. When SWAT 
teams spend the majority of deployments performing simple searches, mostly for drugs47, 
then their intent cannot be for protective defense but to serve an example of a social ill. 
While these alone would disqualify the majority SWAT searches under a JFP application, 
it is important to examine other metrics to determine where else they fail. 
The justifiability of these deployments is further corroded by the fact that many of 
these searches are initiated by what is called a no-knock warrant. These are warrants to 
storm a property without notifying its occupants at the time. It should be restated at this 
point that these deployments can involve upwards of 25 officers, all with military grade 
armor and weapons. They can arrive at the location in an armored personnel carrier, using 
a battering ram (hand or vehicle attached) or breaching charge to make entry. Once they 
enter, they treat all citizens inside as hostile, throwing them onto the floor, deploying 
flash grenades to disorientate them, and handcuffing children in certain cases. The 
argument of these warrants is that an unannounced forceful entry prevents the suspect 
from destroying whatever evidence is the focus of the search. What makes this excuse 
problematic is that anywhere from 36 to 65 percent of these deployments do not produce 
drugs48 and 32 to 65 percent do not produce weapons if they are expected to be on the 
                                                 
47 American Civil Liberties Union, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing, 
(New York: ACLU Foundation, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-
warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf. 31 
48 American Civil Liberties Union, "War Comes Home." 34. 
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property49.  These no-knock tactics violate last resort in two ways. The first is that a brute 
force search is disproportionate to the goal of preserving evidence of a nonviolent crime. 
This logic violates last resort because its dynamic assumes that because evidence is class 
x, it necessitates brute force, despite no requirement to establish evidence x as the result 
of violent activity.  The second violation is demonstrated when the tactic regularly fails to 
produce one to two thirds of the time, the means it fails the reasonable expectation to win 
requirement of last resort.  
  Another point of concern with SWAT tactics has to do with how they violate the 
rest of the jus in bello principles. By applying force equally to anyone, even children, 
within the house, a SWAT search violates the discrimination and necessity principles. 
Even if there is legitimate evidence to merit a no knock warrant, the target is the suspect, 
not whomever happens to be in their vicinity at the time. Indiscriminate force in a SWAT 
search only makes sense when using the suspect's domicile as a catch-all trap and not a 
truly defensive purpose.  SWAT tactics also violate proportionality by deploying military 
equipment to storm what are typically domestic residences. Such military force might be 
necessary if the suspect in question was also tied to murders, known to have other violent 
suspects on his property and/or lived in a fortified compound, but such a justified target is 
rare in SWAT deployments.  
While using SWAT tactics for simple searches violates many JFPs, the most 
obvious violation is necessity. The violation is evident in the destruction that has been 
wrought in certain deployments: officers destroying cushions, walls, cabinets, and 
whatever else that has the potential to contain drugs or weapons. From the current 
perspective this destructive search, whether it be the suspect's property or not, is 
considered acceptable collateral damage in pursuit of the objective. But in many cases 
these searches do not yield enough to offset the damage to a particular property. The fact 
that the majority of these deployments fail jus in bello principles indicates that the current 
practice relies on chance more than actual principled force measures. Make no mistake - 
there are justifiable SWAT deployments, situations where heroes with tactical grit are 
needed, like school shootings and hostage crises, but deploying these people for simple 
searches will only detract and devalue that heroism. 
 
 
Ferguson & Baltimore: A Case Study 
  
 While much of this paper has been devoted to theory and isolated applications of 
JFPs it is important to check them against real world investigations. The following 
section examines specific acts and behavior of two departments that have been 
investigated by the Department of Justice for excessive force: Ferguson and Baltimore. 
Both of these reports evaluate these agencies against constitutional laws, but I can show 
that much of these behaviors are invalidated by JFPs as well. I also show how the 
competent authority principle can be compromised by the collective corporate interest of 
these violations.  
                                                 
49 American Civil Liberties Union, "War Comes Home." 33. 
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 An issue with police today particularly exemplified in the Ferguson50 and 
Baltimore51 reports is use of force in reaction to speech or recording police. In these 
departments, the act of saying something vulgar to police, or even inquiring about your 
rights during a stop could result in force and/or arrest. Such cases are referred to as 
"contempt of cop" and usually result in the "offending" citizen being charged with Failure 
to Comply, Disorderly Conduct, or paradoxically, Resisting Arrest52.  
Even more troubling is the resistance these departments have exhibited in the 
public recording of police activity. Both reports53 54 found cases in which police officers 
escalated their tactics upon discovery that they were being recorded, arresting said 
recorder, and confiscating the recording device and deleting the data involved. While an 
officer must focus on the task at hand in any case, arresting on the simple basis of 
vulgar/derogatory language aimed at officers or recording a police interaction fails almost 
every JFP. It fails just cause because such acts involve no violent crime nor is there a 
reasonable defensive threat being telegraphed by such acts. These arrests also fail right 
intent in that they occur because an officer is merely spurned, not threatened. The 
paramount failure of this behavior is in regards to last resort and proportionality in that 
there is barely any physicality in either swearing or recording until the officer arrests. 
Swearing at police is not respectful, but it is purely a superficial slight. To say it indicates 
a threat is to equate every curse to a physical threat, and then we have a discrimination 
problem.  
The same situation exists in regards to recording, there is no reason this act should 
be considered a threat. If anything, additional video of a supposedly lawful arrest is 
reaffirming the public requirement of competent authority.  While police might not like 
getting sworn at or being recorded, it is something that many others go through daily at 
their respective jobs without recourse to arrest.  
 Another problem both reports indicate is that of weak accountability and lax 
paperwork when force has been used. Both Ferguson55 and Baltimore56 were critiqued 
about inconsistent force reporting and lack of supervisor follow-up on force usage. This 
negligence shows these departments do not do everything they could do administratively 
to track and identify problematic patterns in use of force amongst officers or the 
department as a whole.  
While this part of use-of-force processing is technically in the aftermath of force 
application, it does still compromise the competent authority principle. First, competent 
authority has basis in the organization of the force wielding party, so if supervisors don't 
follow up on force usage, they are complicit in undermining the hierarchy that is 
supposed to ensure competency. Second, the principle has basis in publicity: the authority 
is competent because the public knows who the agents are, and the public acknowledges 
                                                 
50 US Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, (United States Department 
of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 24 
51 US Department of Justice, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, (United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download.116 
52 US Department of Justice, "Ferguson PD" 25 
53 US Department of Justice, "Ferguson PD" 26 
54 US Department of Justice, "Baltimore PD" 119 
55 US Department of Justice, "Ferguson PD" 26 
56 US Department of Justice, "Baltimore PD" 129 
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that force will be used in x cases because x cases are publicly known. By having 
inconsistent or missing paperwork in regards to use-of-force, police hide their force and 
at that point it is no longer public nor is it a competent authority. Records of force are 
part of how force is legitimized in due process. They are the legal proof of force, to 
ignore the due diligence required is to destroy evidence. 
 
Corporate interest vs. Competent authority 
 
 There are three types of will at work in a government; private, corporate, and the 
general (or public) will57. The purpose of government is that government should aim to 
benefit the general will which benefits all, as opposed to a corporate (group) or a private 
(individual) will. When we think of law and/or due process in this country, it is generally 
considered to be good to the general will of all. However, a potential problem with any 
government entity is that such an entity will want to preserve its own power over time, 
which can lead to the development of a corporate interest at conflict with the general will.  
Examples of such wills being contended with can found in both reports, albeit with 
different behaviors.  
 An example of this conflicting interest is when the Ferguson city administration 
colludes with police leadership to maintain the writing of municipal fines and fees to 
support roughly 10% of the city budget58. Ferguson's acting prosecutor also coordinated 
with officers to make sure "all necessary summonses are written"59, in other words, 
making sure certain offenses were bundled with others, leading to multiple charges being 
issued in one interaction. Productivity in Ferguson was considered a reflection of revenue 
via citations rather than any sense of public safety or reduction in a particular crime53. We 
can call these interests corporate, relative to JFP, because they are strategies that have 
financial enrichment instead of public safety as the end goal. The most flagrant violation 
is right intent: these directives are for money and not protective service. A just war 
equivalent directive would be sending troops to seize foreign resources to pay down the 
national debt: it is nowhere close to being justified. There is also the outright disregard 
for last resort evident in the bundled charges directive, which effectively ignores the 
minimum action needed component because it seeks to maximize potential profit.  
 In Baltimore, corporate interest plays out in protection of its agents by actively 
stymieing civilian complaints and investigations into them60.  The main hurdle that 
citizens must go through to get a complaint addressed is to have their misconduct 
allegation signed and notarized in specific physical places.  If a complaint specifically 
involves excessive force, they must swear under penalty of perjury. The DOJ found any 
allegation not made in this in-person format was not followed up61. Couple this with 
officers who were shown to "actively discourage" complaints, sometimes to the point of 
harassment or ridicule62 and you have a situation that further abuses possible victims of 
injustice. Following that there is the willful negligence of supervisors misclassifying 
                                                 
57 Special thanks to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's On the Social Contract for this model of wills 
58 US Department of Justice, "Ferguson PD" 10 
59 US Department of Justice, "Ferguson PD" 11 
60 US Department of Justice, "Baltimore PD" 139 
61 US Department of Justice, "Baltimore PD" 140 
62 US Department of Justice, "Baltimore PD" 141 
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accepted complaints to avoid or soften the internal affairs investigation into the specific 
misconduct. Finally, there is the formal process that a misconduct investigation does not 
typically start until the complainant shows up for a video interview, which delays any 
sort of evidence gathering procedures.  
All of these behaviors together show a force that has no claim to competent 
authority because any attempt for civilian redress is considered an oppositional act.  I say 
oppositional because the threat of perjury in respect to excessive force is at the forefront 
of any complaint.  This forces a civilian into an extra-legal gambit, one that implies if 
their claims cannot be validated they will be charged as a criminal again before any 
formal charges, investigation, or evidence beyond the initial complaint. Such practices 
that protect the corporate will of police effectively corrode competent authority. The 
oppositional stance against complaints also violates right intent. Right intent gets violated 
because these complaints should be treated as complaints of potential criminal action not 
something that gets lost in the bureaucratic ether. 
 Under the guise of organizational survival, these behaviors and characteristics 
indicate a corporate will that supersedes the actual mission of the police. These are 
directly at odds with right intent because they give the public an impression of agents out 
for themselves.  This is not to say a corporate will in police is necessarily a bad thing 
(e.g. police unions), however the more that corporate will appears in contempt of the 
general will, the more an authority's competence in relation to their public mission will be 
questioned.  Police unions are there to help officers have basic operational rights as any 
workers union does, but the problem arises when they vigorously defend their officers in 
the light of allegations still in the process of being substantiated. Such a defense indicates 
police are judged by a better standard than citizens i.e. corporate will. 
 
 Thus concludes the application of JFPs in this paper. These applications have 
shown that these principles can be scaled to any size for examination. I've shown how 
Broken Windows theory fails on its basic premises and leads to indiscriminate force. 
JFPs have shown how the War on Drugs violates the rights of citizens in the pursuit of a 
cause that is unjustifiable. Finally, I've shown how these principles can more easily 
violate the unjustifiable actions that have plagued certain police departments. Admittedly 
there are many more places, instances, and theories where these principles can and should 
be applied. However, I argue that this application and its examples have demonstrated the 
ease and scalability of a Just Force Principled outlook.   
 
V. Objections 
 
 In this section I examine two potential objections in regards to JFP applications. 
The first objection (I call convergence) argues that if we are using force principles 
derived from war conditions aren't we in effect solidifying the convergence of officer into 
soldier? The second objection (I'll call citizen expectation) argues that this JFP 
application is insufficient in that it addresses none of agency expectation of citizens, 
earlier noted as the problem of asymmetry. These are the objections I consider to be the 
most pressing to my the encouragement of JFP applications 
 
The convergence objection 
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 This objection stems from the simple premise that police should not be soldiers 
and using principles derived from war effectively drives the agencies together. Intuition 
suggests that this is possible, but in reality it can only level the expected ethics gap 
between police and soldiers. As argued in section III, police have already been 
militarized via equipment, tactics, and policy wars. While soldiers adhere to universal 
conventions on ethics in war, police have no similar universal charter for their force 
applications. Yet so often an argument is made that the mission of police is roughly 
equivalent to soldiers on the frontline, and both agencies should be accorded a similar 
amount of respect that ignores the lack of universal charter. Thus we need these 
principles more than ever so this country's violence can be justified consistently domestic 
and abroad.  
Another answer to this objection is that the differences made in the translation 
from just war to just force effectively prohibit the concern of JFP making police more 
militaristic.  By putting the emphasis on more objective oriented proportionalities, we 
respect the place due process has in our legal system by justifying force through the 
courts. With the more stringent prohibition against collateral damage, force from police 
must become more surgical and deliberate. Most important is the strength of competent 
authority as an active principle that can be more easily validated as just force rather than 
the domestic just war formulation. While it might be intuitive to say using war derived 
principles push police to more warlike tactics, it is the key differences that elevate police 
to more unique agency. 
  
The citizen expectation objection 
 
 This objection originates in the fact that this argument has been devoted to the 
agency of police utilizing JFPs for Use-of Force whereas little has been mentioned about 
citizen agency under this application. While I have dealt with the problem of asymmetry 
in prior sections, it is important to revisit it here at the end. My reasoning is that civilian 
agency or expectation does not really change under this theory.  We still expect people to 
be good, to not commit crime, and to report it whenever witnessed. JFPs focus on police 
because, taking law as the paradigm, they are they only ones capable of enacting 
justifiable force. Citizens can be justified in defending themselves against an aggressor, 
but this is a consequence of the state of nature prior to legal (police) intervention. There 
might be a traditionalist intuition that will examine at what point does the collective 
violations of competent authority necessitate retaliatory force from citizens. While such 
an argument might exist, the political realities for citizen force to be justified crosses 
back into the just war tradition. Part of the benefit to JFPs is that they are a universal 
force protocol that citizens can more easily understand rather than the fragmented force 
spectrum that varies in legal language from municipality to municipality.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Soldier, officer, citizen: these are the roles that Just Force Principles seek to 
preserve and keep distinct. I have shown the historical precedent of such principles and 
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how they benefit from grounds of moral distinction. While similar principles are utilized 
in regards to police force, their lack of the remaining JFP collective makes their usage 
problematic. The tactics of nationwide "War on" policies have led to militaristic mission 
creep and are in most cases unjustifiable. I've demonstrated how departments use 
unjustifiable force to protect their corporate will at the risk of their competent authority. 
Despite all of these violations, what this paper demonstrates is that JFPs have the 
potential to resolve many controversies with today's law enforcement.  If departments 
across the country start using these principles in regards to how they define and resort to 
force, the public they serve will be better informed and more willing to assent to the 
justification of force. Violence may be an unfortunate truth of our humanity, but its 
deployment for a better good-for less violence overall-must be one of the most principled 
aspects of our society and Just Force Principles are apt for the challenge. 
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